Re: [tor-talk] de-anonymization by correlating circuit changes

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

> If the attacker can monitor many Tor exit nodes throughout the world, then it
> is a global adversary -- Tor won't be enough. The user would be vulnerable
> to a traffic confirmation attack based on timing the network traffic.

All the more reason to support open wifi / open plugin projects.
And again, in the US, completely legally defensible AFAICT.
Certainly evidenced as successful by all the open wifi in restaurants,
bookstores, coffee shops, etc. At least that way you're not
using your traceable connection while speaking freely and
saving the world.
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