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Re: How can I trust all my Tor nodes in path
On 1-Dec-06, at 5:29 PM, Robert Hogan wrote:
On Friday 01 December 2006 21:23, Seth David Schoen wrote:
It's exactly right though! This has got to be the only good use of
Trusted Computing I've ever seen!
Some people have suggested that this is a good application for
trusted computing; proxies could prove that they're running the
real, official proxy software on top of real hardware. Then timing
attacks are still possible, but actually logging data directly could
be prevented. The problem with this seems to be that intentionally
doing timing attacks directly against a proxy you operate, from
the same network, is probably pretty effective!
You've lost me here - could you explain further? How would it
Basically you know, and I know, precisely what's running on the
machine. Say we share the secret keys of the tor nodes, they'd be
guaranteed to be running a known, non-logging version of Tor!
This approach might
be more relevant to lower-latency anonymity services such as e-mail
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TorK - A Tor Controller For KDE - http://tork.sf.net