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Re: How can I trust all my Tor nodes in path

On 1-Dec-06, at 5:29 PM, Robert Hogan wrote:

On Friday 01 December 2006 21:23, Seth David Schoen wrote:

Some people have suggested that this is a good application for
trusted computing; proxies could prove that they're running the
real, official proxy software on top of real hardware. Then timing
attacks are still possible, but actually logging data directly could
be prevented. The problem with this seems to be that intentionally
doing timing attacks directly against a proxy you operate, from within
the same network, is probably pretty effective!

You've lost me here - could you explain further? How would it prevent logging

It's exactly right though! This has got to be the only good use of Trusted Computing I've ever seen!

Basically you know, and I know, precisely what's running on the machine. Say we share the secret keys of the tor nodes, they'd be guaranteed to be running a known, non-logging version of Tor!

This approach might
be more relevant to lower-latency anonymity services such as e-mail


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