Re: How can I trust all my Tor nodes in path

[Jeff <jrishea@xxxxxxxxx>]

On 1-Dec-06, at 5:29 PM, Robert Hogan wrote:

> On Friday 01 December 2006 21:23, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> > Some people have suggested that this is a good application for
> > trusted computing; proxies could prove that they're running the
> > real, official proxy software on top of real hardware.  Then timing
> > attacks are still possible, but actually logging data directly could
> > be prevented.  The problem with this seems to be that intentionally
> > doing timing attacks directly against a proxy you operate, from  
> > within
> > the same network, is probably pretty effective!
>
> You've lost me here - could you explain further? How would it  
> prevent logging
> data?
It's exactly right though! This has got to be the only good use of  
Trusted Computing I've ever seen!

Basically you know, and I know, precisely what's running on the  
machine. Say we share the secret keys of the tor nodes, they'd be  
guaranteed to be running a known, non-logging version of Tor!

> > This approach might
> > be more relevant to lower-latency anonymity services such as e-mail
> > remailers.
>
> --
>
> KlamAV - An Anti-Virus Manager for KDE - http://www.klamav.net
> TorK   - A Tor Controller For KDE      - http://tork.sf.net