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Re: hostile node anonymity attack scenario

On Mon, 31 Jan 2005, Paul Forgey wrote:

> But that requires I trust the first node. Since the crypto starts 
> between the attacker and my node, the attacker can decrypt my data, 
> assuming that it can fool me into thinking it did extend operations.

The crypto starts on your computer.  The tor instance you are running.
node 0 of your chain if you like to call it that.

> So now my question is now this. How can nodes, at any hop, not fool me 
> into thinking they did extend operations when they really did not? Does 
> does my node have public key knowledge of ALL possible nodes it can 
> route through?

Your onion router has knowledge of all nodes, yes.

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