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Re: Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

On 2/14/2011 7:48 AM, grarpamp wrote:
If another example is needed, not that one is; Corporate, edu and
other LAN's sometimes think they can block 'ooo, encryption bad'
ports so they can watch their user's plaintext URL's with their
substandard vendor nanny watch tool of the day. All the while their
staff laughs at them as they happily tunnel whatever they want over
that (perhaps even the client or exit parts of Tor). Yes, this kind
of joke exists :)

Although I've been keeping out of this argument for the most part, and even though I'm leaning towards seeing things Mike's way, I just wanted to comment that I've actually been in an environment like this several times, once at my previous university, and once working for a local government organization. As asinine as such reasoning is on the part of the network administrator (or the person who signs their checks), I can see why the *ability* to run strange exit policies could be a good thing, and should be preserved in the software.

However, I see no reason why providing an anonymous contact email would be so hard. Certainly if you're going out of your way to avoid [insert conspiracy of choice] in order to run a node, you have the skills to use one of the hundreds of free email services out there? I don't think asking for a tiny bit of responsibility on the part of exit operators is too much to ask, and I'm amazed that "allow them to continue to function as middle nodes until they explain why their node appears broken or malicious" is continually being turned into some kind of human-rights violation.

~Justin Aplin

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