Thus spake Andrew Lewman (andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > On Wed, 08 Feb 2012 23:13:44 +0100 > Moritz Bartl <moritz@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > I believe it's more important to make it easy for people to detect Tor > > and deal with it differently in the first place. The second step then > > is to provide useful alternatives to blocking. > > Perhaps someone wants to implement nymble, > http://cgi.soic.indiana.edu/~kapadia/nymble/index.php I admit I haven't read all of the various iterations of the Nymble literature, but every one I've looked at so far seems to start with "Assume you have some expensive, scare resource. Let's say IP address"... Even if they blind it properly with some clever distributed trust scheme that requires multiple colluding parties to divulge the entire Tor userbase IP list, it seems to me that IPv4 addresses aren't really scarce when you're talking about one-time use only to obtain a Nym that can be used for a while. Therefore, my current thinking in https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4666 is that if we can authenticate computation as the scarce resource, why do we even need a full Nymble server? At best it *might* ease implementation for account banning, but it probably would just add another point of failure and useless complexity. Am I wrong? -- Mike Perry
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