Re: [tor-talk] corridor, a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway

[Patrick Schleizer <adrelanos@xxxxxxxxxx>]

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Rusty Bird:
> Patrick Schleizer:
>> The problem is, any Whonix-Workstation behind Whonix-Gateway -
>> once compromised - can claim to be another Whonix-Workstation,
>> thus not being stream isolated anymore.
>> 
>> This could be solved, when there was a defense, that prevented 
>> impersonating other workstations. VPN and/or Static ARP entries
>> and/or OpenSSH could be used for that purpose.
> 
> (How) does Qubes deal with this?

Last time I checked, it it did not. (Apart from the workaround of
using a separate Tor-VM per workstation.)

I guess they'd be also interested to discuss your new concept on their
qubes-devel mailing list.

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