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Re: [tor-talk] Exit Traffic classification and discrimination

Dear Sirs,

I had Dropbox professional and they restore the all files stored in Dropbox.

I can offer this solution to you.

And I wish "GO TO HELL" to the tor-people.

Best regards,


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Thank you.

Asset management, trusteeship and banking counseling

-------- Original Message --------
From: "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists" <lists@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Apparently from: tor-talk-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To: tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Exit Traffic classification and discrimination
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 14:26:23 +0100

> Answers in-line.
> On 1/31/16 5:00 PM, amuse wrote:
> > Hi Fabio:
> > 
> > TLDR: No, I haven't and wouldn't try this.
> > 
> > 
> > If I understand, you're asking "Why don't TOR operators discriminate on
> > traffic by passing packets to popular, acceptable sites and
> > discriminating against traffic headed "elsewhere" by re-routing it.
> > 
> > This view ignores a few fundamental facts underlying the very existence
> > of TOR.
> From the point of view of a Tor users, there's absolutely no change in
> the Threat Model.
> From the point of view of a Tor Relay operator, there would be a better
> resiliency against takedown due to Abuses.
> > 
> > 1) That tools such as TOR exist specifically to enable that last 10% of
> > "dangerous" traffic - given that every political regime gets to decide
> > what they think is "Dangerous".  In Saudia Arabia, criticism of the king
> > is dangerous traffic. In China, discussion of the Tienanmen square
> > massacre is also dangerous. TOR exists specifically to facilitate this
> > traffic.
> We are not speaking about whats "Dangerous" for a Tor user, but what's
> "Abuse-Generating" for  Tor Operator.
> I think that most of those discussions you're referring to:
> - does not trigger abuses being sent to the ISPs
> - happens mostly on major internet platforms (let's say the top-30)
> > 
> > 2) That the most objectionable traffic will probably be going to a lot
> > of the top-30 websites, as that's where political discussions need to be
> > brought to gain any sort of critical mass to bring them out of anonymous
> > online enclaves and translate them into real political activity.
> > 
> > Finally, I wonder whether you have any experience actually, in practice,
> > trying to differentiate traffic as "abuse" from "not abuse". If there
> > were any even close-to-accurate ways of doing this, I suspect ISP's
> > would already be doing it and even your abusive TOR traffic would get
> > dropped at peering connections.
> When i used to run Tor Exit relays, i never received abuses coming from
> traffic being directed to major internet websites (ie: google, facebook,
> wikipedia, etc).
> The ISPs are already doing that, it's called "Traffic Engineering", but
> it's not done due toe "abuse" or "not abuse", because the abuses are not
> a major issues for an ISP.
> Abuses are a major issues for Tor operators, not for ISPs.
> > 
> > In practice, it's very difficult to tell if even "clearly abusive"
> > traffic - say, XSS attempts or SQL injection scanners - are abuse by
> > some annoying hackers, or research by someone trying to assess how many
> > home IP cameras are vulnerable to being part of a botnet, or even an
> > authorized pen-tester just checking out their client's distributed offices.
> Any digital attacks attempt going trough Tor, has to be considered
> abusive, because it generate abuses.
> Btw if you try to make a web attacks against:
> - Facebook or Google or  (no abuse received)
> - A major abuse (abuse received)
> That's why traffic engineering with such a multi-homing approach, could
> really works differentiating traffic designated to
> top-internet-destination (that does not generate abuses but may
> represent most of the traffic) vs. rest of the internet (that's likely a
> minor part of the traffic, but in this chunk there's surely the
> abuse-generating one).
> Btw it's not easy to be technically implemented
> Fabio
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