[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: Cryptopolitik and the Darknet

> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Steve Kinney <admin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 08:59:32 -0500
> Subject: Cryptopolitik and the Darknet
> To: cypherpunks@xxxxxxxxxx
> Cryptopolitik and the Darknet

As an erstwhile bridge operator & also one who's put a lot of thought
into the possibilities of abuse of the network, and also never quite
believing that "there are more good than bad people," I found the
article extremely useful.  Two passages from the summary:

"Proponents of hidden services argue that the cryptographic
protocols that power the internet today were at the fringe
of software development and considered a threat as late as
1995. Hidden services, they argue, are what https was 20
years prior: the future of security, not a threat to
security. These arguments are strong, and cannot be
dismissed; the technology may well mature and move into the
mainstream in the future. But the crypto purists, Tor's
developers among them, often fail to acknowledge an even
more fundamental point, one that is deeply rooted in the
recent history of cryptography: enhanced privacy, enhanced
authentication and enhanced user anonymity are not tied to
the service or content provider remaining anonymous and
unregistered. Our first four properties â security,
authentication, user anonymity and cash (or blockchains) â
are entirely disconnected from the fifth: unidentified
hidden exchanges. These issues are conceptually, politically and
technically distinct. "

"End-to-end encryption will therefore always be available to
a determined, capable user. Moreover, at present, the
powerful dynamics of open markets for communication
services do not favour end-to-end encryption among
individuals at a large scale, thus limiting the
technology's wider appeal and uptake. Any attempt to
systematically undermine end-to-end encryption â through
legislation requiring service providers to retain the
option of removing encryption for any given user â will
likely strengthen more secure implementations by creating
more demand for them, and thus help criminals and
militants. We believe it should be a political no-go area
for democratically elected governments to pursue such a

So if it's possible to retain the desirable aspects of onion services
while also abandoning unidentifiability of content providers, why not do
it?  Tor operators and users could then join the rest a progressive
society, no?

I hope everyone takes time to read the article.  Then it would be
interesting to take a poll or vote here to see how the Tor community
feels about this. - eliaz
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to