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Re: What to do at IP number change?
- To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: What to do at IP number change?
- From: "Gregory Maxwell" <gmaxwell@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2008 17:02:07 -0500
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On Jan 7, 2008 4:52 PM, <dr._no@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> that's clear; i'm using TOR as a mix with a transparent local http proxy which uses an ISP
> proxy as parent proxy, so that the exit traffic goes through two proxies and with several numbers
> in the X_FORWARDED_FOR header ;-)
> That's good enough for hiding my public IP to http servers which do log only the TCP/IP number and
> for most which do evaluate the X_FORWARDED_FOR header.
[snip]
I think this is unwise and an example of bad net-citizenship.
Making TOR sessions hard to detect for people that have an actual need
to block TOR will only result in more paranoid witch hunting against
Tor (like we see with some anti-spam RBL lists) and needless
escalation.
If this or things like it continue people who see a need to block (or
otherwise treat differently) users from TOR will simply run probing
hosts across the tor network, wasting TOR bandwidth, and applying
their tor blocks to big proxy servers. The resulting overblockage will
increase general anamosity towards tor. ("Those guys who got my school
blocked from editing wikipedia!").
Basically .. trying to hide exists like this is an arms race that you
can not win, and the price will be anger where understanding and
cooperation are needed most.