Re: [tor-talk] Deterministic builds?

[Paul Syverson <syverson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Jan 05, 2012 at 02:52:42PM +0100, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> On 01/05/2012 02:50 PM, Paul Syverson wrote:
> > Hi Jake,
> > 
> > On Thu, Jan 05, 2012 at 12:15:08PM +0100, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> A few Tor hackers are meeting today to discuss build engineering issues
> >> and we'd like to start a thread on deterministic builds.
> >>
> >> We believe that Windows and Mac OS X both produce build results that are
> >> extremely difficult to verify. On Gnu/Linux sometimes the build results
> >> are difficult to verify.
> >>
> >> If anyone has thoughts on the matter, we'd love to hear how Tor as a
> >> project should tackle verifiable builds of the various software we ship.
> >>
> > 
> > I'm replying just to you. If it's a dumb reply or something already
> > well in hand you can just tell me, and I won't have induced a flood
> > of noise on tor-talk. But if you think I'm asking something that is
> > worth discussing there, feel free to answer on tor-talk and include
> > my question there.
> > 
> > I know only minimally about the area, but does build diversity help
> > at all to address monoculture issues in attacks the way that memory
> > randomization and source code diversity do? I understand that it is
> > good to have determinsitic builds for verification and I'm guessing
> > that even if the answer is yes, the tradeoff is worth it overall. I
> > just think it's good to be fully aware of the tradeoffs being made.
> 
> Heya Paul,
> 
> Good thought!
> 
> In theory, we should get memory space randomization at run time and not
> at build time. Part of the problem is that some build environments
> actually put a time stamp into the binary or something similarly
> annoying. We want to defend against build machines being compromised and
> to allow others to verify that their builds are correct or that ours are
> a mess.
> 

I understand that memory space randomization is a runtime thing.
And I understand why we want verification. I also understand how
version diversity is a "codetime" thing used in general to guard 
against monoculture in a related but distinct way from ASLR etc.
(and that Tor does not currently bother to do version diversity,
and that it is a tradeoff probably not worth making). What I was
asking about was whether there is anything to be _gained_ by the
use of build diversity, either by adding yet another defense for
the multiple issues of software monoculture or something else.

Probably like n-version programming, etc. it is not a worthwhile
tradeoff, but I didn't know if this was a topic that had already
been broached. It's better to consciously reject a tradeoff than
to be unaware of it. You didn't immediately dismiss my question, 
so I'm cc-ing tor-talk (so if you now get what I was asking, you
can tell me it is dumb in public ;>).

aloha,
Paul
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