Thus spake Greg Kalitnikoff (kalitnikoff@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > Assumption: Modern linux distro. User A is default user. User Net and > group Net are the only ones who is allowed to go to the Internet with > iptables. User Tor is that which run TBB and he is in group Net. > > Is it safe to run vidalia+tor as user Tor and "TB/App/Firefox/firefox > --no-remte -profile TBProfile" as default user A? Does it break some > security things? As I understand so far from "The Design and > Implementation of the Tor Browser", the only thing it could break in > default behavior is "New identity" feature. Yes, this should be fine. You will also get New Identity back if you set the TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD and TOR_CONTROL_PORT environment variables properly. I should probably document these two somewhere, as you're not the first to ask about this sort of setup... > P.S. Also reading https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/ > I found this: "Filter-based addons such as AdBlock Plus, Request Policy, > Ghostery, Priv3, and Sharemenot are to be avoided." But here > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2011-November/022052.html > we see Andrew Lewman`s "In my world, I'd replace noscript with > requestpolicy". I`m a bit confused :-/ There should be no need to use filters to address 3rd party linkability with a proper implementation of the requirements in https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#privacy To my knowledge, the only remaining 3rd party direct linkability risk is through HTTP Keepalive (Section 3.5.6), but this linkability is limited to a 20 second window. There is a risk of first party linkability through redirects (Section 3.5.7). This one will be harder to solve, but it is more noticable attack. There are also fingerprinting risks involving time that need to be addressed (3.6.6 and 3.6.7), but the verdict is not in as to exactly how much info these provide in practice. Regardless, we should also have some level of mitigation in place for Tor Browser 2.3.x. It is my opinion that these remaining threats do not justify the need for filters, and that we should focus on eliminating these few remaining issues rather than trying to design a filter mechanism that isn't full of fail. -- Mike Perry Exterminate all dogma. Permit no exceptions.
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