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Re: [tor-talk] Help me secure my setup
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Periodic consensus downloads, as well as keeping always some fresh
circuits on the list in order to attach streams to when requested via
the SocksPort. In other words, not much traffic but not 0 traffic as well.
Related to your other questions, you might be using too much
complexity which is in most of cases not desired. To be frank I didn't
understand your goals and threat model...
If I were you I would just configure a good vpn on the server in the
datacenter (say openvpn for example with my own certs and everything)
and connect to the vpn first, then normally (no bridges) to Tor. This
will probably obfuscate some adversaries in learning that you are
using Tor from home.
Connecting to the VPN after you connect to Tor will provide you an
unique static exit point from the Tor network which will make you very
very distinguishable so I would not do that if I were you.
On 1/10/2016 8:08 PM, Oskar Wendel wrote:
> Oskar Wendel <o.wendel@xxxxx>:
>> 1. Maybe I should run a private (unpublished) bridge on the
>> server and a tor client on my tor PC, that would be able to
>> connect only to the bridge (through a VPN)? This way, all
>> unencrypted traffic would never exit a tor PC. This PC is secured
>> enough to assume it's secure from being hacked into. It's also
>> encrypted and never left unattended.
> Additional question: For an idling client (that is, a tor client
> that is connected, but nobody connects to its socks port), what
> network activity takes place? I can think only of periodic
> consensus downloads. Anything else?
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