Hey, with more and more relays driven by volunteers, we can reduce this risk. And this is an reason why server operators are using "myfamily" field in the relay configuration, to not use other relays driven by them... Be careful about exists relays, the server operator can sniff the traffic, and if I'm not wrong, can retrieve for example a password in clear text sent on a http (not http*s*!) form. About circuits used to surf the web, your Tor browser will change automatically every 10minutes if I'm not wrong. You can check it on the little onion button... Try to visit the same website on a new tab, another circuit will be used. ->For sure some "older" Tor people have better explanations to this question ;) But for me, Tor is a good network to annoy people who are trying to spy you ;) Absolutely better than using the usual home network... Le 08/01/2017 à 10:36, Arthur Wang a écrit : > What if there are quite many enough compromised tor nodes ,that are made up > by attackers ? > > One node can record the source and destination of an access , tow nodes can > combine tow points into a line , and when there are quite many nodes that > are made up by on attacker , he can then draw a full map of an access , and > finally find out the real ip address where does the request originally > issued out . > > Can this scenario possibly occur for the current tor network ? > > I got this question after read the page describing the principle of tor : > https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en > > > Thanks. -- Petrusko C0BF 2184 4A77 4A18 90E9 F72C B3CA E665 EBE2 3AE5
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