Re: [tor-talk] Secure email with limited usable metadata

[Andreas Krey <a.krey@xxxxxx>]

On Mon, 01 Jul 2013 22:18:06 +0000, coderman wrote:
...
> you should assume this number will always approach anything greater
> than zero; and how do you handle a reduction? axe clients without
> prejudice?

Put new clients into the next instance of this service, formally
operated by someone else?

> better option: end-to-end only, usable privacy that is secure by
> default - the only mode is secure.  then you can publish "lawful
> intercepts" of ciphertext without risk to any users.**

Lawful intercepts also include the access metadata (which I assume to
be equally secure here), and access to the emails themselves. While
encrypted the service still has to know source and destination to
some extent.

Also, LI interception is a cost factor.

> if you're forced to cooperate with active malware explotation of
> customers through assisted MitM via your services it is time to pull
> the plug and announce while you find a sane jurisdiction.

I guess under NSLs this could be construed as publishing same,
so the NSL effectively forces you to stay in business.

Andreas

-- 
"Totally trivial. Famous last words."
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@*.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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