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Re: [tor-talk] FBI cracked Tor security
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On 07/19/2016 03:50 AM, Jon Tullett wrote:
> On 19 July 2016 at 08:31, Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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>> On 07/18/2016 07:08 PM, Jon Tullett wrote:
>>> On 18 July 2016 at 16:17, Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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>>>> A few years ago, I wrote
>>> Have you updated it to account for subverted VPN providers?
>>> Advising people to use VPNs which may have been subject to
>>> national security letters is arguably bad.
>> Which VPNs have received NSLs?
> I take it that's a no, then?
I account for it by distributing trust, just as Tor does.
> Point being, not only do we now know which operators have received
> letters, we _can't_ know. The first rule of NSL club is you don't
> talk about NSL club. I have yet to see much evidence that warrant
> canaries help. And that's not the only risk; operators can be
> coerced, hacked, suborned, or otherwise compromised. Belgacom, for
What Tor relays have received NSLs?
> We mitigate that by layering services, but that's back to the
> question of how complex an environment suits your risk profile. Not
> everyone has the same nut; not everyone needs the same size
The NSA is a pretty big nutcracker ;)
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