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Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels


Ethan White:
Ping latency decreases when CPU usage is high
an adversary can influence CPU usage to transmit data

I can confirm that disabling c-states does completely
prevent this attack.


providing an option in Tails to disable c-states,
perhaps in the form of a GRUB entry

Up front like that would be okay but fragments the settings a bit; like activating I2P.

Tails Greeter is the most suitable place for such a setting; in the 'Additional Settings' section.

Articulating this attack in such a small place can become a challenge (:

Would disabling ping replies do the same thing, because that may be more effective in communicating the concern ?


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