Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

[Spencer <spencerone@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi,

> Ethan White:
> Ping latency decreases when CPU usage is high
> an adversary can influence CPU usage to transmit data
>
> I can confirm that disabling c-states does completely
> prevent this attack.

Dope.

> providing an option in Tails to disable c-states,
> perhaps in the form of a GRUB entry

Up front like that would be okay but fragments the settings a bit; like 
activating I2P.

Tails Greeter is the most suitable place for such a setting; in the 
'Additional Settings' section.

Articulating this attack in such a small place can become a challenge (:

Would disabling ping replies do the same thing, because that may be more 
effective in communicating the concern ?

Wordlife,
Spencer



--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk