Re: jurisdictional concentration of authorities

["tor-operator@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <tor-operator@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Scríobh Martin Fick:
> But, just for grinns, how would ICANN go about attacking
> an individual host anyway?  Surely they cannot revoke my
> personal IP, could they?  My ISP owns that now, not ICANN,
> right?  For them to revoke the block that my ISP owns, it
> would be a major time consuming task wouldn't it?  That
> would mean that while they may be targeting me individually,
> they would have to be attacking many others, including my
> ISP inadvertently.  Surely, by the time the attack were
> successful (years presumably?) I would have simply opened 
> another account with another ISP, perhaps even in another
> country and gotten my self another IP, no?

Accurate enough.  ICANN may have the clout to eventually get a given IP 
allocation's recipient to act to suppress traffic from a specific IP, 
but ICANN doesn't directly have the ability to cause one IP address out 
of an RIR allocation to go dark.

From a BGP standpoint, it doesn't work on the global BGP tables for 
everyone to try to do that anyway.  Many of the tier1 providers and 
their customers filter announcements more precise than /24.