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Re: many new relays
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- Subject: Re: many new relays
- From: grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 03:05:56 -0400
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I'd give it a 15 minute mile high eyeball if I
had the 'before the jump' cache files or
a 'getinfo desc/all-recent' from back then.
I just don't have that dataset.
> It means everyone is busy working on other things.
Yep, it's just an on the radar thing.
> more stats about the effect of other major media
> stories about Tor, Slashdot effect, etc.
I think the Tor project may indeed have some long term
data such as a simple relay count in RRD. Just thought
I saw some graphs once.
There's probably a roadmap somewhere that gives an
idea of when Tor would be felt ready for more general
mass consumption/advertisment.
> This whole Iran thing is a great way for a number of
> adversaries to slip in undetected.
In bulk, in short order, yes, perhaps. Though if I
were a serious adversary I would probably advise
against something as we've just seen. I suggested
doing the analysis because often the first rollout
of anything is botched in some fashion. And there's
limited time to catch it, then learning occurs and
the future ones appear normal.
And of course, as a secondary check, the non-black Tor
break canary has yet to be seen in the public courts.