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[tor-talk] Bruce Schneier's Guardian Article about N_S_A and Tor.
I recently read a Guardian article from last October
by Bruce Schneier about the N_S_A and Tor. His story was based on the
"Tor Stinks" and "Egotistical Giraffe" presentations.
My understanding of the article is that if individual(s) are requesting
http://www.target_website.com then, once the request leaves the exit
node, the N_S_A can use their Quantum servers on the Internet's
backbones to redirect the request to their FoxAcid servers in order to
compromise the requester.
I don't understand what Schneier means by this:
"After identifying an individual Tor user on the internet, the NSA uses
its network of secret internet servers to redirect those users to
another set of secret internet servers, with the codename FoxAcid, to
infect the user's computer."
Surely the whole point of Tor is that the requester of
http://www.target_website.com cannot be identified based on the traffic
which leaves the exit node. Since the N_S_A would only know the IP
address of the exit node and the destination
http://www.target_website.com, how can the client be identified even if
the traffic is redirected to the FoxAcid servers?
Indeed, the previous paragraph appears to contradict the paragraph
"The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity service, and the
fact that all Tor users look alike on the internet, makes it easy to
differentiate Tor users from other web users. On the other hand, the
anonymity provided by Tor makes it impossible for the NSA to know who
the user is, or whether or not the user is in the US."
Therefore, the N_S_A can redirect traffic that leaves the exit node to
the FoxAcid servers but how could they send back a response to a
specific Tor user? Or have I misunderstood the article?
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