On 2016-06-05 14:31, Flipchan wrote:
I do not have any beta code. This was merely a suggestion. The added randomized delays (two separate sets) and randomized data padding (two separate sets) would make it more difficult to correlate traffic. I think it could be done in a way that still allows Tor to keep latency low.Got any beta code on this? Maybe add/c ode it as a daemon ?;)Not Friendly <notfriendly@xxxxxxxxxx> skrev: (5 juni 2016 16:40:52 CEST)After about an hour of brain storming I may of found a way to stop traffic correlation attacks. The idea is to add an artificial delay of a few randomized ms (two separate delays, one to the tor exit and another deal on traffic exiting the network) and add an extra chunk of randomized data (just a small random amount of KB that never exits the network). It would make traffic harder to correlate. What are your thoughts on this? -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk-- Sincerly Flipchan
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