[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,



On 2016-06-05 17:20, Allen wrote:

So randomizing the times that traffic enters the network and exits the
network wouldn't work? Like it enters a note and 30 ms after received or another random delay couldn't it exit. It would be harder to correlate the
traffic right?


IMO, the packets would probably need to be randomly delayed at each node, not just entering and exiting the network. A mathematical model would be needed to determine the necessary amount of delay (I doubt 30 ms would be enough). The delay could be chosen by the originating node, so it could
chose the privacy vs latency tradeoff.

It might also be beneficial to have two channels to each exit node, with each channel used in only one direction, i.e., outbound packets travel one
route, while inbound packets travel a different route.

That's a good idea. If we could get a system of micro delays which wouldn't cause major issues it'd be nice in protecting Tor users anonymity. It's an issue that has been acknowledged by the tor project but we haven't been able to find a working system yet. I think it's more important then ever that we begin to address these issues.
--
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk