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Re: [tor-talk] Browserprint fingerprinting website

To: tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Browserprint fingerprinting website
From: Allen <allenpmd@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2016 10:31:52 -0400
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>
> This is very interesting. It's worth looking into whether Tor Browser
> should disable these types of behaviors (since it could identify the user's
> OS). It'll take time but I think updates to stop the fingerprinting
> techniques in the mentioned website are possible.
>

Several already have Tor Trac tickets, see https://browserprint.info/sources
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Follow-Ups:
- Re: [tor-talk] Browserprint fingerprinting website
  - From: Green Dream

References:
- [tor-talk] Browserprint fingerprinting website
  - From: cube
- Re: [tor-talk] Browserprint fingerprinting website
  - From: Nurmi, Juha
- Re: [tor-talk] Browserprint fingerprinting website
  - From: Not Friendly

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