Hi, While I've been developing the LiveCDs Incognito and Tails I've got my fair share of feature requests/bug reports that really are about Tor. One recurring feature request is to make NEWNYM stricter. Users have observed that issuing a NEWNYM doesn't necessarily stop using the previous circuits, which is obviously the case for truly long lived connections like IRC and SSH, but I don't think that is what bothers them; web browsing connections also keep using the old circtuits, at least with certain web browser and intermediate proxy configurations that makes them "kinda" long lived (think http keep-alive timeouts). This confuses users when they get the same exit node after a NEWNYM (for instance by refreshing check.torproject.org afterwards). Conclusion: NEWNYM doesn't do what the users expect. That's no good. Why don't we make NEWNYM ruthlessly kill all circuits, even the ones handling live connections, long lived or not? I strongly believe this stricter NEWNYM behaviour is (at least closer to) what the user expects from it. See the attached patch for a quick and dirty implementation -- a patch says more than a thousand words, I suppose. Of course, to use NEWNYM requires some caution from the user, e.g. clearing cookies, session id etc. if revisiting the same site, but that also affects the old NEWNYM approach. Maybe it's even the case that NEWNYM gives a false sense of a new identity, given all application level problems that Tor cannot (or at least shouldn't) do anything about, and thus we should give a shite? In any case, are there any new problems introduced by this more brutal approach that I haven't thought of which would make it worse than the previous one? Cheers!
diff -Naur tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/circuitbuild.c tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/circuitbuild.c
--- tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2011-01-25 22:33:39.000000000 +0100
+++ tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2011-03-04 11:44:01.212529978 +0100
@@ -2066,8 +2066,7 @@
can_complete_circuit=0; /* so it'll log when it works again */
control_event_client_status(severity, "CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED REASON=%s",
"CLOCK_JUMPED");
- circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
- circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
+ circuit_mark_all_circs();
}
/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion
diff -Naur tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/circuitlist.c tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/circuitlist.c
--- tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/circuitlist.c 2011-01-25 22:33:39.000000000 +0100
+++ tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/circuitlist.c 2011-03-04 11:42:30.748529978 +0100
@@ -1002,16 +1002,18 @@
}
/** Go through the circuitlist; mark-for-close each circuit that starts
- * at us but has not yet been used. */
+ * at us.
+ *
+ * This is useful for letting the user change pseudonyms, so new
+ * streams will not be linkable to old streams. */
void
-circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void)
+circuit_mark_all_circs(void)
{
circuit_t *circ;
for (circ=global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
- !circ->marked_for_close &&
- !circ->timestamp_dirty)
+ !circ->marked_for_close)
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
}
}
@@ -1019,9 +1021,6 @@
/** Go through the circuitlist; for each circuit that starts at us
* and is dirty, frob its timestamp_dirty so we won't use it for any
* new streams.
- *
- * This is useful for letting the user change pseudonyms, so new
- * streams will not be linkable to old streams.
*/
void
circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void)
diff -Naur tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/circuitlist.h tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/circuitlist.h
--- tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/circuitlist.h 2011-01-16 04:44:28.000000000 +0100
+++ tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/circuitlist.h 2011-03-04 11:37:44.186529978 +0100
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
or_circuit_t *circuit_get_intro_point(const char *digest);
origin_circuit_t *circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose,
extend_info_t *info, int flags);
-void circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void);
+void circuit_mark_all_circs(void);
void circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void);
void _circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason,
int line, const char *file);
diff -Naur tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/config.c tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/config.c
--- tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/config.c 2011-01-25 22:33:58.000000000 +0100
+++ tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/config.c 2011-03-04 11:42:47.604529977 +0100
@@ -1263,9 +1263,8 @@
options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Changed to using entry guards, or changed preferred or "
- "excluded node lists. Abandoning previous circuits.");
- circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
- circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
+ "excluded node lists. Abandoning all circuits.");
+ circuit_mark_all_circs();
}
/* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge?
diff -Naur tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/main.c tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/main.c
--- tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.old/src/or/main.c 2011-01-25 22:33:39.000000000 +0100
+++ tor-0.2.2.22-alpha.newnym/src/or/main.c 2011-03-04 11:43:13.514529979 +0100
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@
static void
signewnym_impl(time_t now)
{
- circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
+ circuit_mark_all_circs();
addressmap_clear_transient();
time_of_last_signewnym = now;
signewnym_is_pending = 0;
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