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[tor-talk] Risk with transparent proxy mode [was Re:Operating system updates / software installation behind Tor Transparent Proxy]
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 12:33 AM, <proper@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>...
> Application level leaks are problematic. We have a page which describes many of these problems including with workarounds (we recommend Tor Browser etc.).
these are significant if you are mixing tor and non-tor access on the
same system. much of this is covered in the thread, and the particular
risks are very specific to context and nature of use, as discussed.
> Anyway, transparent proxying should be still safer then socksifying.
yes. there are still poor and better ways to configure transparent proxy.
> The transparently proxied operating system does not know it's real external IP, only it's Tor exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external IP. ... DNS / UDP leaks are impossible. Real IP may also not leak, the operating system doesn't have a way to find it out.
this is not true; you must also prevent all local subnet access when
in this mode. this may entail removing IPv6 interfaces, changing the
default route to a /31 or /30 path, etc.
otherwise there are attacks which reflect or bounce traffic on the
local network to obtain public IP address or leak endpoint to an
attacker.
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