Re: [tor-talk] Newbie with a bunch of questions for Tor Cloud

[Soul Plane <soulplane11@xxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 6:01 PM, Runa A. Sandvik <runa.sandvik@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:

> On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 9:05 PM, Soul Plane <soulplane11@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > More questions:
> >
> > Why is the only region available for the Tor images us-east virginia? I
> > thought I could use the free tier in other places. Wouldn't it be better
> to
> > vary the regions instead of sticking them all in one place?
>
> We initially had images in all regions, but due to a bug/issue (see
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10318) I decided to
> temporarily remove all images except the ones in us-east-1. The goal
> is to bring back images for the other regions at some point.
>

Thanks, I read the bug and the AWS thread and it looks like there is
something wrong with the image copy process. If I wanted to setup in a
location other than Virginia would I be able to use your build script to do
that or would I run into the same image copy problem? Also I noticed in
ec2-prep.sh you have:
curl -m 5 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/reservation-id
That address is invalid, what is the reservation id for?


>
> > I read in Tor Weekly News today that the obfs3 protocol is vulnerable to
> > active probing attacks and there is a replacement ScrambleSuit. If I
> setup
> > the AWS Obfsproxy image now does that mean the Chinese can detect it and
> > block it? Is that image obfs2 or 3 or both? Should I just wait until
> > ScrambleSuit is supported, or can I modify the config file to only use
> > ScrambleSuit, or is that not a good idea at this point? I don't want to
> run
> > something that nobody is going to be able to use because governments can
> > just detect it and block it.
>
> The current image is a "standard" bridge, an obfs2 bridge, and an
> obfs3 bridge. ScrambleSuit is not included. If you create an SSH key
> when setting up the instance, you can log on and change whatever you
> want. The Great Firewall of China blocks "standard" bridges and obfs2,
> but I believe it has yet to block obfs3.
>

Ok so after I do a build if I want scramblesuit I change this line:
ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy --managed
to this:
ServerTransportPlugin scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy --managed

According to this here I need to update obfsproxy first? Is that relevant
here?
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003886.html


>
> > Is Tor obfuscation specifically more likely to come under attack from
> > repressive governments?
>
> More likely than what?
>

Than regular tor bridges. Are obfs3 bridges special bridges that users in
repressive countries are more likely to use because other bridges are
blocked? Maybe I don't understand.


>
> > How is security handled. For example suppose there's a known
> vulnerability
> > in Tor or Ubuntu does the server shut down until it's fixed and an update
> > is available or does the server stay up and risk being hacked? Is there
> any
> > notification sent to the AWS administrator in these cases? I would
> imagine
> > even a small window is gold for some state run group to break in.
>
> The server stays up and checks for regular package updates from
> Ubuntu. If someone were to break in, they would not learn anything
> more than if they had set up a bridge themselves.
>

Ok. Let's say there was a security vulnerability being exploited in Tor
bridges. Is there any warning from Tor staff? Like when there is one in
Flash or Microsoft etc I will get a CERT or a security advisory saying "xxx
is being actively exploited", view such and such a page for more
information. In those cases I will just turn off flash or run the fix it.


>
> > How can I determine the integrity of the server and do I have any
> > responsibility to do that? Do you guys who are running these instances in
> > the Tor Cloud just set it and forget it or is there some oversight
> required?
>
> The Ubuntu image the Tor Cloud image is based off of is verified when
> the image is built. The Tor package is verified as it is installed
> (which happens within the first five minutes you boot the server for
> the very first time).
>

Thanks I took a look at the script.


>
> > I would take an active role in securing the instance if necessary but I
> > need to know what to do. What do you guys do?
>
> The image has been configured to automatically check for package
> updates. In addition, it is recommended that you only open certain
> ports in the firewall (22 for SSH, plus 443, 40872 and 52176 for Tor).
>

Is there any obfuscation benefit to using random ports, like changing
40872  to 1234 etc.

Thanks
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