Re: [tor-talk] Revoking a hidden service key

[Adrien Johnson <adrienj@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Putting a passphrase on the master secret key (in the current system) 
would protect from theft if the hidden service is offline. But if the 
service is online, the master secret key needs to be stored decrypted in 
memory so the hidden service can sign and publish its updated 
descriptors. If the hidden service is compromised while running, 
attackers would just steal the decrypted key from memory and not bother 
with the encrypted one  in the filesystem. So unfortunately an RSA 
passphrase does not provide as much extra security as we would like.

-Adrien

On 2015-03-03 12:45 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> The keys are RSA, we need to be able to put an optional passphrase
> on them (for startup as in httpd) as a simple first (and zero cost/design
> to network) measure to eliminate their value to thieves. This has not been
> done. There have been threads and tickets on this whole key management
> topic.

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