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Re: Some legal trouble with TOR in France
Niels Ferguson says "over my dead body:"
http://blogs.msdn.com/si_team/archive/2006/03/02/542590.aspx He's
also said as much to me in person, as has Peter Biddle.
Adam
On Sun, May 14, 2006 at 10:43:22AM -0700, Ringo Kamens wrote:
| I'm not saying the AES is weak. I'm saying that Microsoft might have
| implemented a back-door for governments. They could store the private keys and
| passwords in videocard memory or in the boot sector or something like that.
|
| On 5/14/06, Tony <Tony@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
|
|
| 2. The restrictions on encryption were removed some years ago. The best
| encryption software comes from outside the USA anyway so it was always a
| pointless exercise in futility.
|
|
|
| Unless a vulnerability is found in 256 bit AES it would take them longer
| than the ages of the universe to crack a key by brute force no matter how
| many terraflops of power they have to task on your key (not to mention the
| many others they might want to crack)
|
|
|
| 3. Filtering content is not quite the same as signing code and pretending
| it comes from Microsoft. Such a piece of code would have a changed checksum
| would likely be spotted and then analysed. I can't see Microsoft doing that
| unless required by law.
|
|
|
| 4. TPM is part of the trusted computing concept. It just makes it much
| harder. Not impossible.
|
|
|
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| From: owner-or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
| Behalf Of Ringo Kamens
| Sent: 14 May 2006 18:31
|
|
| To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
| Subject: Re: Some legal trouble with TOR in France
|
|
|
| There are a few key points that you are overlooking.
|
|
|
| 1. In support of the photocopying money scandal, most printers have yellow
| dots imprinted on them that track date printed, serial number, etc.
|
|
|
| 2. By US export law, US companies are not allowed to export encryption
| larger than 56 bit (although it might have jumped to 128 a few years ago),
| unless it has been certified by the government. That means unless it has a
| backdoor. Plus, governments have thousands of teraflops of idle computer
| cycles waiting to crack your keys.
|
|
|
| 3. How can you honestly think Microsoft wouldn't bend over for the US
| government. They bent over for China. Look at PGP. They moved to closed
| source after version 6.0 with no valid reason. The reason is probably the
| government.
|
|
|
| 4. In terms of using checksums to ensure your system hasn't been tampered
| with, the computer hardware could have a defense system against that such
| as trusted computing.
|
|
|
| Ringo Kamens
|
|
|
| On 5/14/06, Mike Zanker < mike@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
|
| On 14/5/06 15:10, Tony wrote:
|
| > Nb- failure to disclose keys is up to two years in prison. Not 10.
| >
| > (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable-
| >
| > (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
| > exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
| > (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
| > six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.
|
| Furthermore, that's part III of RIPA which hasn't been enacted yet.
|
| Mike.
|
|
|
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