On Sat, May 20, 2006 at 02:37:39PM -0400, Ringo Kamens wrote: > I have a few points to add. For one, if you choose a user-agent that > is a linux build every time you start firefox (as opposed to having it > default) then that could be used as court evidence to say: > Well, I couldn't be xxx because he used a linux browser and I'm > obviously on windows and my user-agent field isn't spoofed. I'm not a lawyer, so I'm not going to comment on your legal theories. But from a technical anonymity perspective, choosing an unusual user agent probably isn't a good idea: if 100K Tor users appear to be using user agent X, and you use a less popular user agent Y, it's easier for websites and observers to build a pseudonymous profile for your actions. This is why I'd really like this discussion to arrive at an improved privoxy configuration to ship with Tor: even if you, personally, know a better configuration than the default, you might still be better off using the default configuration in order to blend in with a larger crowd. See the "Anonymity loves company" paper for more discussion. yrs, -- Nick Mathewson
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