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Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries
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- Subject: Re: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries
- From: coderman <coderman@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 28 May 2007 03:36:05 -0700
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On 5/28/07, Steven Murdoch <tortalk+Steven.Murdoch@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
... an experiment to establish how diverse the topology of the Tor network
is -- an important component of how secure it is against traffic
I've now finished the draft version of the resulting paper...
hi Steven; an enjoyable read. thank you!
i am curious about a few aspects.
you state "an assumption that the global passive adversary is
unrealistic". is this really true in anonymity research circles? it
seems the evidence to the contrary is well supported. i do prefer the
"those who are the target of such adversaries have larger problems
than anonymous Internet access" statement instead. :)
i am also curious if you had considered lower layer propinquity of
physical paths. critical infrastructure research has shown how even
seemingly disparate and redundant paths are often inhabiting common
right of way and facilities. is the assumption that inspection at
OC/WDM layers is too cumbersome/expensive for all but the previously
mentioned TLA/$gov adversaries?
given the surprises looking at network topology from an IX rather than
AS level, i'd expect a similar revelation when viewing from an optical
carrier vantage point.
sadly, the information useful for such study has become a subject of
heated and irrational censorship post 9/11. i'll stop this tangent
early before i delve into a heated rant about critical infrastructure
and terrorism madness... *g*