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Re: 25 tbreg relays in directory

     On Thu, 30 Apr 2009 16:59:58 -0400 Andrew Lewman <andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>On Mon, 27 Apr 2009 23:57:17 -0500 (CDT)
>Scott Bennett <bennett@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>In general, these options seem a fine way to partition the tor
>network.  Possibly more so for new releases and arbitraging the time
>during which clients and relays upgrade. Tor clients already don't

     Well, the developers themselves did that a while back when they
cut off the non-V2Dir-capable clients and servers, right?

>trust the relays. The risk is possibly more to the relay operator than

     How so?  Does a client refuse to use a relay whose version is not
in the server-versions list distributed in the V3 consensus documents
or the V2 status documents?

>the tor clients using their relay.  It's their OS in most cases that's
>at risk, not so much the Tor network.  
>> 	b) tor clients will not choose relays whose versions do not
>> match a version listed in server-versions when choosing routes for
>> circuits. This could be implemented as additional code in
>> circuitbuild.c or it might be implemented more simply by having the
>> authorities refuse to give a "Valid" flag to such relays.
>An option to allow your client to only select from a list of relays
>running a version as agreed by the DA's as recommended seems the better
>of your a vs b.

     Well, yes, I thought quite a while before suggesting a), but also
realized that there can be quite a long delay and upheaval involved in
a change to the directory standard and protocol, so I suggested the use
of b) in the interim.  Suggestion a) is, in the long run, a better approach.
>We should stop talking about making the relay trust the client.  I
>don't think implementing a DRM scheme serves Tor in any way.  If you

     That was not me, FWIW.  However, I did suggest that a client not trust
*itself* if its own version were not listed in client-versions in the V3
consensus or the V2 status.

>think of Tor like TCP, then the whole discussion gets silly.  Tor is an
>anonymizing protocol on top of tcp/ip, for now.  Hidden services and

     Right.  It would be good to have an SCTP implementation of tor someday.

>such are example applications that use Tor, the protocol.
>Roger and I have had conversations about this thread in taxis, train
>stations, and the like as we've been traveling.  I'm sure he'll comment

     My goodness!  I had no idea that it would really generate much interest
among developers.  I only hoped so.

>at some point.
     I predict that will interesting. :-)

                                  Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
* Internet:       bennett at cs.niu.edu                              *
* "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good  *
* objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments *
* -- a standing army."                                               *
*    -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790         *