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Re: Bridges and China (new thread)

On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 4:06 PM,  <andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Rather than continue to hijack the old thread, here's a new one about
> bridges and china.
> I'm fully aware the GFW seems to have successfully crawled
> https://bridges.torproject.org and added all of those bridges into their
> blocking regime.  The email distribution method, bridges@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
> may also have been crawled and added to the blocking regime.  There are
> still 3 other pools of bridge addresses, one of which is held in
> reserve.  It seems the other two methods are continuing to work, as a
> paltry 5000 connections from China still can access Tor daily.  This is
> vastly smaller than the 100,000 or so we used to get.

Is it worth adding a captcha to bridges.torproject.org? Incidentally,
what happens when "adversaries" just block access to that site?

How about responding to bridge request emails with a captcha style
email attachment with the IPs of bridges?

That would kill any automated attempt to scrape the bridges?

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