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Re: Bridges and China (new thread)
- To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: Bridges and China (new thread)
- From: Al MailingList <alpal.mailinglist@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 26 May 2010 20:42:12 +0100
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On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 4:06 PM, <andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Rather than continue to hijack the old thread, here's a new one about
> bridges and china.
>
> I'm fully aware the GFW seems to have successfully crawled
> https://bridges.torproject.org and added all of those bridges into their
> blocking regime. The email distribution method, bridges@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
> may also have been crawled and added to the blocking regime. There are
> still 3 other pools of bridge addresses, one of which is held in
> reserve. It seems the other two methods are continuing to work, as a
> paltry 5000 connections from China still can access Tor daily. This is
> vastly smaller than the 100,000 or so we used to get.
Is it worth adding a captcha to bridges.torproject.org? Incidentally,
what happens when "adversaries" just block access to that site?
How about responding to bridge request emails with a captcha style
email attachment with the IPs of bridges?
That would kill any automated attempt to scrape the bridges?
Al
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