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Re: [tor-talk] tor/netfilter: packets without uid

> > Âecho 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_rfc1337
> not the right option; this is different, and to avoid an issue with time wait.
> the feature i'm thinking of is time-wait negotiation, which can be
> tweaked to always put this state on the peer (or fail if not
> available).
> last time i messed with this is was kernel build tweaks; probably too
> much for most tastes ;)
> regarding the match rules, why are you whitelisting a firefox
> instances? a robust setup is everything transparently routed, except
> for Tor PID, and only this PID. kernel originated traffic and all
> other application originated traffic is thus routed properly without
> bypass, assuming Tor itself is not vulnerable.


thanks for your persisting interest in my issue. I appreciate it. Unfortunately your sysconf switches don't work for me. That's fine. I think I will simply drop non-uid 42 bytes packets from now on, without explicit logging. (I cannot afford a 72MiB syslog after a few days of computer usage)

Regarding my setup, it is not that simple. Actually I have four firefox users and four dedicated tor instances for these users. Each firefox is dedicated to special requirements.

I have lots of other users, each for dedicated use cases. All other users, including my main user, do not have internet access at all.

This setup-up is loosely based on the setup another Tor user presented on this very list a few years ago.

What I fear most is not a breach of my anonymity or the breakage of firefox due to exploitation (geez, browser suck so much these days). I fear the mix-up of application traffic which in turn breaks the anonymity of the application stream that I really want to be anonymous. E.g. I usually have all three browser opened, routing all of their traffic through the same tor instance is madness.
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