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Re: The Case for Banning Reduced Hop Count Implementations
Thank you Lucky. I had been meaning to write something like your
On Mon, Nov 23, 2009 at 02:43:47AM -0500, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2009 at 12:29 AM, Lucky Green <shamrock@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > seeking higher anonymity. The end state, if lower than three hop
> > implementations are permitted to use the Tor network, is that Tor's
> > network performance will acceptable only to users of lower hop clients.
> I presume you can back this assertion up with simulation results, at a minimum?
> I look forward to reading your paper.
Even if Lucky's basic points are eventually born out, you are right
that more analysis of latency and incentives would be valuable. To
get an idea about incentive issues in anonymous communication in
general and Tor in particular you might want to look at "On the
Economics of Anonymity". Also "Anonymity Loves Company: Usability and
the Network Effect" both available from the Freehaven anonbib. Also,
"Deploying Low-Latency Anonymity: Design Challenges and Social
Factors" which is available from the onion-router.net publications
> > origin. The protocols commonly used for such downloads can accept higher
> > latency than the interactive protocols needed by the part of the user
> Which is why twiddling the hop count isn't attractive for them.
> It is attractive for IRC, for example, because with the current hop
> counts it can be difficult to keep a TCP connection up for long.
> Long lived connections don't benefit much from the longer paths in
> any case because the provide ample opportunity to simply correlate
> entry and exit traffic and ignore the interior path.
This has nothing to do with how long the connections are. Onion
routing going back even before Tor acknowledges that if the entry and
exit nodes are controlled/observed then an adversary will quickly and
trivially link them. The nutshell way we have said this is that onion
routing [including Tor] guards against traffic analysis not traffic
confirmation. This was acknowledged in the original Tor design paper
and was later born out by analysis ("Passive Attack Analysis for
Connection-Based Anonymity Systems") experiments on the live Tor
network ("Locating Hidden Services") and in simulation on PlanetLab
("Low-Resource Routing Attacks Against Tor"). These confirmed that
correlation was fast and easy. "Sampled Traffic Analysis by
Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries" showed that it could also be done
sampling a tiny fraction of the traffic passing through an IX. This
is also why onion routing's security is said to be roughly c^2/n^2,
where c is the number of compromised nodes in the network and n is the
total number of nodes. (Yes that is a little too quick, and you can
raise questions. See "Towards an Analysis of Onion Routing Security",
"A Model of Onion Routing with Provable Anonymity", and "Probabilistic
Analysis of Onion Routing in a Black-box Model" for details.)
The "Low-Resource" paper is especially telling wrt your point: the
attacks were done during connection setup _before a single data cell
was transmitted_ (and with vanishingly few false-positives). You just
don't need to have a long-lived connection to fall victim to this. So
why bother with multiple hops? One part of the answer is already given
above: it reduces the threat quadratically. But why three hops instead
of just two? This comes back to Lucky's other point that you skipped
over. And this one is not subtle at all.
Three hops is the minimum to guarantee that all an exit node knows is
that a circuit came from someone using Tor. The exit cannot say even where
in the Tor network the circuit started. Similarly, all an entry node
knows is that the circuit is headed somewhere. (Yes, this too is
actually more subtle; cf. "How Much Anonymity does Network Latency
Leak?" But, a priori, given ordinary log information, it is correct.
(Of course honest Tor nodes do not do any such logging.))
So, reducing the number of hops means that exit nodes have
significantly more information about connection origins. Reducing hops
to one means that they know everything about the origin of a
connection (up to the IP address from which the connection entered the
Tor network, which is all that Tor is designed to hide.) That makes
their deniability of what they know about traffic exiting through them
no longer plausible (because, well now it will be false). That any of
the connections going through the network are single hop thus
increases incentives to attack any exit node, also any entrance
node---which basically means all the public nodes. Details would
depend on likelyhood that a given circuit is one hop and on the
incentives, legal considerations, resources, etc. of the
adversary. But absent such details, it would be unwise to allow such a
fundamental threat to the infrastructure itself.
As Lucky observed, this is a threat to the public Tor network itself
and should be treated as such. There are other drawbacks that could be
noted, but that is the central one.
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