On Wed, 14 Nov 2012 04:47:38 -0500 Roger Dingledine <arma@xxxxxxx> wrote: > Right. I've got a half-drafted "the lifecycle of a new Tor relay" blog > post sitting around here somewhere. That would be great. :) > If you want to read a lot more about guard flag allocation, see > "Changing of the Guards: A Framework for Understanding and Improving > Entry Guard Selection in Tor" > published at this year's WPES: > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wpes12-cogs Yes I have read descriptions of the Guard flag, but to be honest I am not convinced at all by the arguments presented in its favour. To me it just seems to be an elaborate trade off that results in "if you are f***ed, ensure you are f***ed as completely as possible and with the most dire consequences possible". "An adversary has a chance to see some of my entry traffic for some time" ...seems rather harmless to me compared to the Guards system's of: "an adversary has a chance to see ALL of my entry traffic for a long period" > Oh, and I'll leave you with one final thought: ensuring "maximum possible > bandwidth consumption" might not actually be the best goal here. Every > time your relay's bandwidthrate token bucket runs dry, that's a pile of > Tor users who have to wait another second before their bytes will move > forward. The best Tor network is one where no relays are bottlenecked. The nodes are far from being at network bottleneck, I mean b/w consumption in terms of terabytes per month, since in most cases what I have is a bandwidth arrangement where on a 100 Mbit or 1 Gbit port usage of X TB/month is possible and this costs Y USD. Unused bandwidth from one month does not carry over to the next, so it's suboptimal when a node only uses like 30-50% of what it could have used that month. -- With respect, Roman ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ "Stallman had a printer, with code he could not see. So he began to tinker, and set the software free."
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