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Re: [tor-talk] Project Gutenberg
On 01/11/2013 12:39 AM, mick wrote:
On Thu, 31 Oct 2013 17:59:39 +1030
DeveloperChris <developerchris@xxxxxxxxxxxx> allegedly wrote:
Could exit nodes act as caches. I know that would introduce a number
of issues including a compromised exit node revealing what was
retrieved by that node (but not whom for) so if it was limited to a
few popular 'safe' sites it could help alleviate those sites from
some of the traffic burden.
I think that might cause a few problems. Firstly, the obvious one of
definitions. Define "safe". Who gets to decide whch sites are OK to
cache and whch aren't. Definitions will vary according to the user's
location and the regime under which s/he lives (or the location or
regime under which the owner/operator of the relay lives.
Yes precisely. So if you considered running a caching exit node it would
only be sites that are safe for you the exit node operator to run
Obvious ones are non copyrighted and non copyrightable stuff like the
Gutenberg project I think Wikipedia has a policy that is amenable and there
would be thousands of others.
Secondly, by caching (and thus later serving) data the relay ceases to
be just a neutral "common carrier" and moves into the realm of
hosting provider. I see lots of room for lawyers to get fat(ter) on the
back of legal argument about whether a relay providing a cached copy of
a document can be sued (for whatever reason). Look at the stupid
situation we already have where sites simply pointing to torrent
sites are taken down (while of course Google, which has fat lawyers,
doesn't get taken down).
Of course torrents, kiddie porn etc would not be considered safe.
Thirdly, the simple act of serving a copy from cache, rather than
transparently passing the request out to the end server, means that
the relay by definition is now intercepting Tor traffic (even if
only to "help" the end user).
This is the main issue that I see. I agree with you here one hundred
percent. but if we are to persuade sites like the gutenbergproject not to
directly block tor exit nodes then I am not sure what else can be done?
Fourthly, the end user might not /want/ Tor to "help" in this way
(I wouldn't). What guarantee do I have that the Tor relay is giving
me exactly what I wanted and not some "tampered" copy. How can I
really trust a supposedly anonymous network which I now know to be
looking into my requests with a view to giving me a "better" or
"faster" service.
Exit nodes by their nature must look at your request. Whats to stop an exit
node modifying the response now?
And how would I cope with SSL?
As is currently done. Its not cached and it cant be. end of story
Best
Mick
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Mick Morgan
gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B 72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312
http://baldric.net
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But in the end its just a thought.
DC
Please keep the replies civil. I know there is one in every crowd. Don't be
that one.
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