On 02/11/2013 8:19 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 02:45:51AM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote:
Snip
Actually, technically, the analogy would be trying to deanonymize a client from a subverted website. The Tor client running the hidden service picks its own three hops, so it's HS -> Guard -> Middle -> Middle -> Rendpoint <- Middle <- Guard <- Client --Roger
I hate to say it that gives me no confidence at all. Only the randomly chosen guard at the HS end needs to be compromised and the whole chain becomes worthless. A timing attack will reveal all. But there are better ways and far more reliable ways than a timing attack. Your diagram has crystalised a thought that has been running through my head for the last day.
DCPlease keep the replies civil. I know there is one in every crowd. Don't be that one.
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