Re: [tor-talk] Cloak Tor Router

[CJ <tor@xxxxxxxx>]

On 11/03/2014 07:07 AM, Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
> On Sunday 02 November 2014 12:08:15 Lars Boegild Thomsen wrote:
>> 1. 100 % Automatic
>>
>> The device check at regular intervals if a new binary firmware is available and if that is the case it just updates.  This one is entirely possible and not hard to implement.  I am however not sure I like it.  If someone managed to hijack our domain name that someone could brick all devices in one go.  There is also the possibility of accidental bricking of thousands devices (even Microsoft have released updates that crashed Windows, and Google have screwed up their android updates quite often).  In short - I personally don't like this one but I am willing to stand corrected and be convinced otherwise.
>>
>> 2. Automatic update of Tor alone
>>
>> This is a bit software as in the binary firmware stays as it is but only the Tor package gets updated.  It's got the same security issues as number 1, but less of a risk of bricking accidentally and a path to recovery IF a bad update was submitted.
>>
>> 3. Visual indication of "action needed"
>>
>> In our current hardware design we actually included a RGB LED for this very reason.  We could have that flashing RED (and label it "Update needed" on the box) if not up to date but still leave it for the user to update.  I am personally leaning towards this one unless the issues with 1 or 2 can be solved but I am aware that a lot of people won't update.
>>
>> 4. Refuse to function unless updated
>>
>> Would flash red as in 3 but refuse to run unless the firmware is updated.  I personally think this one is too annoying from a usability point of view.
> 
> I thought of another one that might be the best option so far:
> 
> 5. Have a dedicated status LED that will flash RED if system need upgrade.  I don't like the idea of a fully automatic upgrade, but the device _will_ have a button and it could be that when the RED upgrade LED flashes, the device can be upgraded with a press of the button.  That approach is still to some degree vulnerable to a man in the middle (DNS hijack) attack though.
> 

Well, I hope you will implement firmware signature checkâ this would
prevent most of the MitM problems.
This should be optional though, in order to let "power-users" mess with
their own firmware if they want.
Better: let them push their own key on their very own device so that
they might as well secure their updates.
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