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Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
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- Subject: Re: funneling a wireless net's outbound connections through tor
- From: "Michael_google gmail_Gersten" <keybounce@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2007 16:25:50 -0700
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I think this discussion brings up an interesting point, again.
Tor [b] changes [/b] the risks you are opened to.
It removes the risk of ISP's, search engines, and advertisers from
tracking your click stream, and being the receipt of a government
request for your online history. (Most people don't need tor because
of the anonymity. The more people using tor, the better hidden those
that do need it are hidden.)
It exposes serious MITM attacks for anything that is not HTTPS: unless
you use exit guards.
We have entry guards specifically because otherwise evil node group X
will at some point grab your entry node and exit node, and correlate
who you are.
We need exit guards specifically because otherwise evil exit node X
will at some point grab your authentication cookies.
Previously, someone said that having both entry guards and exit guards
together was self defeating. Do we need exit guards more than we need