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[tor-talk] Flashproxys' impact on Tors' fingerprint
beside the case that the connection itself looks different due to the
use of (web)sockets (like explained in the paper) is there any impact on
how one could fingerprint on Tors' traffic?
From my point of view (non-crypto, non-dev, non-network-expert) it would
be bad if an adversary would be able to look for the handshake of Tor.
(If it doesn't make fingerprinting more difficult...) how complicated
would it to have another layer in flashproxy that helps in this regard?
(I want to avoid another thread an it's close enough.) What else could
be implemented in WebSockets to have a wide range of "legitimate" use?
(In order to make it painful for an adversary to block WebSockets)
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