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Re: [tor-talk] Silk Road taken down by FBI
If there is any wiretap in place to monitor VPN then it would instantly drop the connection because encryption has been tampered with - that's the whole design for VPN. Once a VPN server detects a line that has been tampered with, it will drop the connection and proceed to create a new connection.
---- Original Message ----
From: "mirimir"
To: tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Sun, Oct 6, 2013, 02:41 AM
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Silk Road taken down by FBI
On 10/05/2013 12:08 PM, Lunar wrote:
BM-2cWto4coLsoD6LrFmFcUeBAua7UU2gvTSR@xxxxxxxxxxxxx (mailto:BM-2cWto4coLsoD6LrFmFcUeBAua7UU2gvTSR@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
Not necessarily, as long VPN provider doesn't keep logs of your
traffic. Like for instance, Phantom Peer works wonderfully since you
can use bitcoin for their service.
Sorry, but no.
It is easy to order a wiretap on the VPN uplinks (without even the
VPN operators knowing it) and to match packets going in and out.
Nobody is plausibly claiming that VPN services are as anonymous as Tor
is. However, it's just as easy to tap uplinks for Tor routers. But of
course, there are (probably) many more Tor routers than VPN services.
And Tor routers are distributed among several spheres of influence, some
of which don't cooperate readily.
Still, if one uses nested VPN tunnels from multiple providers in
suitably chosen spheres of influence, it will be nontrivial for
adversaries to install enough taps. Going through China, for example,
would be a serious roadblock for US-aligned TLAs. Even with four nested
VPN tunnels, latency and bandwidth are far better than using Tor.
Finally, it's not either/or. It's easy to include Tor in nested VPN
configurations. Latency is typically over two seconds, but bandwidth is
adequate, especially for UDP traffic.
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