Re: [tor-talk] Bitcoin over Tor isn’t a good idea (Alex Biryukov / Ivan Pustogarov story)

[s7r <s7r@xxxxxxxxxx>]

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Here are some Bitcoin reliable nodes sponsored by Thomas (TheCthulhu)
accessible via Tor hidden services:

h2vlpudzphzqxutd.onion

sbow7bnje2f4gcvt.onion

dioq2yg3l5ptgpge.onion

All use Bitcoin default port 8333. These servers are up all the time
and very fast.

Hidden services are end-to-end encrypted so the risk of MITM between
nodes does not exist. Also, if you run bitcoin in such a way with
onlynet=tor enabled in config, nobody listening your wire can have a
slight clue that you use bitcoin.

We think tor-hidden-services only Bitcoin nodes are a very important
part of the Bitcoin ecosystem.

Getting them running is quite simple. You just need disk space, at
least 50GB free for now. Here are some guides:

https://www.sky-ip.org/configure-bitcoin-node-debian-ubuntu.html

https://www.sky-ip.org/configure-bitcoin-node-freebsd.html

On 10/27/2014 10:03 PM, Thomas White wrote:
> I didn't realise my nodes didn't allow the bitcoin port. I'll get 
> right on it.
> 
> Also, if anyone in the Tor community has spare capacity, you can
> also setup a full bitcoin node on the same server you use as an 
> exit/relay/bridge and it doesn't take up a great deal of resources 
> other than disk space (16Gb I think right now and growing slowly).
> On my series of exits there is also full bitcoin nodes accessible 
> exclusively over hidden services and others which are accessible
> over regular clearnet.
> 
> -T
> 
> On 27/10/2014 19:58, grarpamp wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:35 PM, Erik de Castro Lopo 
>> <mle+tools@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> http://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.6079v1.pdf
> 
>>> Could this situation be improved if people ran limited exit
>>> nodes that only alloed the bitcoin p2p protocol to exit? I for
>>> one don't have enough
> 
>> There are about ten exit nodes that do only this today. [One of 
>> which is run by Mike Hearn who has advocated building in
>> censorship capabilities to Tor, and blocking (historically)
>> tainted coins (such as you have now or might receive through
>> otherwise completely innocent transactions with you, or from your
>> own trans/mixing with others).]
> 
>> Then there is question if your client will select such 'only
>> *coin' nodes versus those with high bandwidth and open exit
>> policies.
> 
>> There are also a fair number of hidden services in Tor/I2P/CJDNS
>>  that act as bitcoin nodes.
> 
>> As related tangent, yes, the bitcoin protocol needs to be 
>> encrypted on the wire, at least bitcoin node to bitcoin node
>> with TLS, obviously and urgently so, particularly if you wish to
>> guard your trans from wire listeners.
> 
>> You might be best to in fact run bitcoin always and entirely
>> over Tor, especially while transacting. But then also routinely
>> compare that received blockchain to one you receive via
>> alternate/trusted sources, such as clearnet or signed bittorrent
>> checkpoints.
> 
> 
> 
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