Re: [tor-talk] Tor and Google error / CAPTCHAs.

[Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@xxxxxxxxx>]

On 3 October 2016 at 19:34, Seth David Schoen <schoen@xxxxxxx> wrote:

> Alec Muffett writes:
>
> > To a first approximation I am in favour of maximising all of those, but
> > practically I feel that that's a foolhardy proposition - simply, my
> Netflix
> > viewing, or whatever, does not need to be anonymised.
>
> I appreciate your approach to analyzing what Tor-like tools need to be
> able to do, but I wanted to question this a little bit.
>

Okay.



> Some of us privacy advocates have felt that it's quite bad that
> communications technologies generate location and association metadata
> in the first place.


Okay.



> I've often said in interviews that it's a flaw in
> the cell phone infrastructure that it generates location data about
> its users, for example, and that it would be better to have a mobile
> communications infrastructure where location anonymity was the default
> for everybody all of the time.
>

I can see that - I am very much in favour of not collecting (and therefore
not having to store or scrub) data that one does not actually need.

That said, I am also a big fan of comprehensive debugging information for
working out what the hell went wrong, and so I can see the applicability to
mobile comms of location information.

And then I am aware of some of the asinine requirements for geolocked DRM
which some media organisations (eg: the BBC) place upon their viewers &
listeners, often for legacy reasons.

And I really don't know how to square this quadridimensional oblate
spheroid of conflicting wants, desires and contractual and legal obligation.

So when it comes down to cases I just try to do my best if I am designing
the architecture, and (where I am the customer) I try to avoid services
where I consider the data collection to be egregious - and I tell my
friends to do the same.


I wouldn't want to concede that it's appropriate that all of that data
> gets generated all of the time, even if you can't see any sensitivity to
> it at a particular moment.


Yep.  This is the point that I have made in past - when lecturing about
security opsec - that the GPS that helps you drive home is also the one
which has a history feature that will tell your spouse where your you have
been meeting your lover, and will be produced in evidence at the divorce
proceedings.


It seems that people often discover later on that they wish they had
> taken precautions to protect some data that didn't seem significant at
> the moment.


I think you'll find that's a standard in history textbooks. :-)

    -a

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