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Re: [tor-talk] ascertain trustworthyness of entry-nodes and obfs4 bridges?
On Wed, 03 Oct 2018 08:41:29 +0000, ithor wrote:
> So would there be a way to (pen-?)test a private obfs4 bridge as being non blacklisted and actually usable without really trying to connect to it and alarming my ISP and DPI the like ?
Obviously not. To test that you need to try to connect to it and
consequently risk running into a block.
For the paranoid: The firewall operator might just as well just log who
is using known brigde (incl. obfs4) addresses but letting the connections
pass to just see who is using tor.
> This seems like an overlooked security and privacy issue with a lot of possible consequences.
It's not as much overlooked but almost impossible to avoid. The only
is/was domain fronting on a cloud provider and might be encrypted SNI
once that itself is widely deployed - only then do you look the same
as regular internet users.
On the other hand, the question is whether using tor itself is outlawed or raising suspicion in your country.
> Same thing for the entry-nodes. How can I know for sure the randomly selected one isn't rune by some gvt trol ?
By knowing and trusting the operator. That's the reason tor stopped
swapping entry nodes around - the fewer you use the lower the risk.
Also, geographic selection: Depending on the country of the relay,
trolls are unlikely to report to your gvt.
"Totally trivial. Famous last words."
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@*.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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