Re: Random chaff [was: more work for Grobbages]

[Paul Syverson <syverson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, Sep 23, 2009 at 11:11:29AM -0400, Praedor Atrebates wrote:
> It would appear that the tor network should include some timing
> randomization and reordering of packets to thwart such analysis.
> Not so much to really slow things down but enough to throw up
> uncertainty in the packet analyses.


You're trying to turn it into a mix network. The order uncertainty
doesn't matter at this level of latency. The Bauer et al. research I
mentioned showed how to do timing attacks based just on setting
up the circuit. You don't even need to send any data.

Whatever solution (if one even exists) is out there, most of
the straightforward ideas and many of the not so straightforward
ideas have already been extensively researched. Cf. the papers
Nick and I mentioned before and others in the Freehaven anonbib.

aloha,
Paul