On Tue, 14 Sep 2010 03:33:33 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Also, regarding the interaction with HS directory lookups and > excludenodes... i would suggest that specification in excludenodes > should prevent all contact with such node for all reasons. Or just > make another option for how to handle that case as well. This is > more important than the above paragraph. As one could have a node > that is a 'bad' exit through no fault/intent of its operator... > such as being plugged into a non-ideal isp... yet it would still > be perfectly useful when acting as a non-exit or directory provider. The following options should do what you want: ExcludeNodes node,node,... A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. ExcludeExitNodes node,node,... A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list. StrictNodes 0|1 If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit. If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits. -- more than just a leitmotif PGP Key ID: 33E22AB1
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