On 9/13/2013 1:56 AM, Michael Wolf wrote: > From the Tor FAQ: > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#BetterAnonymity > >> "Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay? >> >> Yes, you do get better anonymity against some attacks. >> >> The simplest example is an attacker who owns a small number of Tor >> relays. He will see a connection from you, but he won't be able to >> know whether the connection originated at your computer or was >> relayed from somebody else." > > I'm wondering if this is actually the case. > ... Just to be clear here, my intent is not to say "Tor doesn't do what it says it does", or anything of the sort. If my points are correct, I'm suggesting that the FAQ be updated to reflect this reality, and perhaps instead stress the ways that running a relay indirectly improves your anonymity. For example, running a relay increases both the node diversity and the total bandwidth of the network, which encourages more users to use Tor. The more Tor users, the lower the probability that any given traffic at an exit node belongs to you. This could be listed as an indirect benefit. One might also suggest that increasing network bandwidth improves user experience -- and happy Tor users are more likely to add relays to the network or suggest Tor to a friend, who might setup a relay. As before, increased node diversity and traffic improve anonymity for everyone. There could still be mention that running an Entry Guard can give you even more anonymity -- I just think it needs clarified more that simply running a (middle) relay does not mean the next node can't tell if the traffic belongs to you or not. (That is, assuming the points in my previous email were correct).
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