Re: [tor-talk] Unusual Tor's spikes in Egypt and Turkey on 28th August

[krishna e bera <keb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 20/09/17 06:00 AM, Alec Muffett wrote:
> In certain respects this can be read as "TBB's threat model excessively
> trades-off consistency and usability in favour of protections which
> $SOME_MAJORITY of its userbase do not actually need" - but I'm okay with
> the status quo.
> 
> I would rather that TBB "shoot for the stars" in terms of integrity,
> privacy and anonymity-protection, though I exhort any/all efforts that work
> to address this issue.
> 
> The one insight that I can bring to the table here is this: the number of
> people who know how to (and *do*) use Tor at-need, vastly exceeds the
> number of people who use it on a regular basis; this is also why the
> autoupdate mechanism (and improvements to the security and speed thereof)
> are fundamental to the TBB proposition.
> 
> I'd really love to see Tor, TBB and TBB-Plugin mechanisms upgraded to run
> over single-onion, for instance.  It would make sense.
> 
>     -a
> 

If by single-onion you mean single-relay, the problems with that are
discussed at this FAQ entry.  In particular, it increases the risk that
exit relays will be seized and their operators investigated on the
chance that the Tor user can be traced.
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#ChoosePathLength

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