Re: [tor-talk] Onioncat and Tor Hidden Services V3

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

On 8/20/19, Bernhard R. Fischer <bf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I finally wrote a HOWTO on using OnionCat with v3 hidden services. I
> also did some patches to OnionCat to have a better integration.
>
> https://www.onioncat.org/2019/08/onioncat-and-tor-hidden-services-v3/

Thanks.

Rather than tor killing off v2 onions and HSDirs from the
codebase, thus ending all the good useful carefully chosen
and even required reasons people still use v2 and onioncat
(some of which can be found by searching list archives
for onioncat, P2P, VoIP, add more uses here)...

tor could update the default to create v3 onions,
and to require manual config of v2 onions, and to emit
nanny warnings pointing to a v2 vs v3 comparison table
on the wiki, update v2 to be as small a diff as possible
from v3, modularize v2 support and HSDir operations.
That way v2 and v3 users remain happy.

It also seems possible that a solution to what
onioncat provides via v2 onions (IPv6, UDP, IP transport
services in the host stack out across onionland, some
crazy routes between I2P, metrics ping, etc) could be
designed for v3 onions. Perhaps some form of time
expired or first come served 1:1 registration to HSDir hashring
for lookups, a NameCoin like sidechain, or using one of the
existing Tor / I2P native addressing enabled privacy cryptocurrency
blockchains as lookup index, or some new and open network
overlay DHT layer for everyone, or AF_WIDE, IPFS or
other hash based storage network, etc.

Even some tradeoffs in a solution to achieve a v3 onioncat
might be acceptable... in the same way that some v2 "security risk"
issues are accepted today by those needing what onioncat offers
thus overriding that, or are not relavant because their application
use model is not affected by such risk.
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