Re: [tor-bugs] #1984 [Torflow]: Bw Auths should assign 0 bw to first hops that fail

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <torproject-admin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#1984: Bw Auths should assign 0 bw to first hops that fail
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |          Owner:  mikeperry
     Type:  defect     |         Status:  new      
 Priority:  normal     |      Milestone:           
Component:  Torflow    |        Version:           
 Keywords:             |         Parent:           
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:           
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
Description changed by mikeperry:

Old description:

> Right now we have about 50 extremely overloaded guard nodes (the Pandora*
> set) that are failing TLS connections, dir connections, and just about
> everything else.
>
> However, when they do manage to actually rarely complete a circuit, they
> have huge bandwidth capacity available.
>
> What we should do is assign a measurement of 0 every time we try to use a
> node as a first hop, but it fails to accept our extend.
>
> We can try to do this to the 2nd hop too, but that is less reliable,
> since it won't be clear if that extend failed because the guard sucks or
> if the node is actually broken..
>
> We could ensure that each exit is measured at least twice as an entry, or
> something.

New description:

 Right now we have about 50 extremely overloaded guard nodes (the Pandora*
 set) that are failing TLS connections, dir connections, and just about
 everything else.

 However, when they do manage to actually rarely complete a circuit, they
 have huge bandwidth capacity available.

 What we should do is assign a measurement of 0 every time we try to use a
 node as a first hop, but it fails to accept our extend.

 We can try to do this to the 2nd hop too, but that is less reliable, since
 it won't be clear if that extend failed because the 1st hop sucks or if
 2nd hop is actually broken... We could ensure that each exit is measured
 at least twice as an entry, or something, to improve this property
 (maybe).

--

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1984#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs