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Re: [tor-bugs] #5968 [Tor]: Improve onion key and TLS management
#5968: Improve onion key and TLS management
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
Reporter: mikeperry | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-relay | Parent: #5456
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by mikeperry):
Replying to [comment:11 nickm]:
> Replying to [comment:10 mikeperry]:
> > Aha! You only have 3 guards, and Directory Guards means you now only
need to make exactly that many TLS connections as a client.
> >
> > This means we could include the TLS hash only in the full descriptor,
and clients could then simply fetch the full descriptor for their guards.
>
> Fetch from whom? If they get the descriptor from the party they assume
is their guard, it could be a fake one signed by the adversary (if the
adversary has compromised the guard's identity key). If they get it
directly from some other party, they will be leaking who their guards are,
*AND* that party could give them a one-off fake one, or an old one, or
whatever. (The defense against getting an old/weird descriptor is
checking its digest against the one listed in the consensus. But the
microdescriptor consensus doesn't list descriptor digests.)
Oh damnit. I did not realize that clients stopped downloading the full
consensus in favor of the microdesc-only one. Moreover, I also didn't know
the microdescriptors in no way authenticated full descriptors. That sucks.
I guess we're back to deciding if the overhead is worth it for this or
not? Looks like it comes out to about 3% overhead for including a 256bit
hash for each relay in the current cached-microdescs file.,,
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5968#comment:12>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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